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TO MOVE DOWNSTREAM
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LINK TO POLICY ADOPTED: 
see Mineral and Coal Mining law (non-official 
English translation)
KEY COMMODITIES: 
Petroleum, nickel, copper, tin1
TOTAL NATURAL RESOURCE RENTS  
(AS % OF GDP) (2015): 
2.3 per cent2 
NATIONAL EXTRACTIVES COMPANY: 
Pertamina; Antam; PTB; Inalum
UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX VALUE (2016): 
0.689 (Global Rank 113)3
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world-factbook/fields/2111.html
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3 United Nations Development Programme. (2016). Human Development Reports: Indonesia. Geneva, Switzerland. Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/
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Indonesia is the largest exporter of nickel ore and 
tin in the world and ranks among the biggest for 
copper and gold production. To add value to these 
minerals, Indonesia imposed an export ban which 
has recently been relaxed due to private sector 
pushback and falling revenues. While the short-
term costs of the ban are apparent, the long-term 
impacts remain unclear. 
When establishing the export ban, the Government 
of Indonesia was willing to accept short-term 
revenue losses in exchange for long-term gains. 
These losses were exacerbated due to falling 
commodity prices. The resulting redundancies 
and economic downturn for regions dependent 
on bauxite, nickel and copper extraction turned 
out to be too drastic for the ban to be politically 
feasible. The policy U-turn within a few years has 
tarnished Indonesia’s credibility with investors and 
miners. Given that the ban is still in place and the 
granting of export permits continues to depend on 
investments in smelting facilities, Indonesia will be 
2an interesting case to follow to better understand 
the short- and long-term costs/benefits of 
downstream beneficiation policies.  
The Indonesia case study highlights the need to 
target downstream policies by sector and the 
shortcomings of blanket regulations. For nickel 
and copper, where Indonesia boasts world-class 
reserves, companies have largely remained and are 
more likely to build processing facilities. Indonesia’s 
weaker position in bauxite has meant that a lot of 
operations have shut down and investors have left 
due to the export ban.4
THE EXPORT BAN
The 2009 Mineral and Coal Mining law foresaw 
the need to add value and process domestically. 
Based on this law, in January 2014 a presidential 
4 Home, A. (2015, March). Bauxite and the limits of resource nationalism. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-bauxite-
ahome/bauxite-and-the-limits-of-resource-nationalism-andy-home-idUSKBN0MN2B620150327
5 Indonesia-Investments. (2014, April). ICRA Indonesia: Analysis of economic impact of raw minerals export ban. Retrieved from https://www.indonesia-
investments.com/finance/financial-columns/icra-indonesia-analysis-of-economic-impact-of-raw-minerals-export-ban/item1901?
decree was passed that imposed an export ban on 
unprocessed minerals. More specifically, the ban 
included the following provisions based on two types 
of minerals that are defined as follows:5
• Type 1 minerals (bauxite, nickel, tin, 
chromium, gold and silver) are required to be 
processed and refined prior to export. 
• Type 2 minerals (copper, iron, lead, 
manganese, ilmenite, titanium and zinc) 
could be exported as concentrates 
without further refining until January 2017 
if the companies could demonstrate the 
construction of processing and smelting 
facilities individually or collectively. 
This differentiation was agreed after 66 
companies, including the heavyweights 
Freeport McMoRan and Newmont, lobbied 
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Figure 1. Progressive export duty tariffs for Type 2 minerals
3time to build up processing capacity.6 Until 
January 2017 companies were subject to 
progressive export taxes that started at 20 
per cent in 2014 depending on the mineral 
and gradually increased to 60  
per cent by 2016 (see Figure 1).7 8
IMPACT OF THE BAN
Until 2013 Indonesia hosted only one copper 
smelter where the biggest mining companies of the 
country, namely Freeport McMoRan and Newmont, 
had been smelting 40 per cent and 25 per cent of 
their copper production respectively.9 In January 
2017, most miners missed the government’s 
deadline to build smelters and stockpiled lower-
grade nickel ores, bauxite, copper concentrates 
and other metals.10 As revenues fell due to the loss 
of the export business and the sharp decline in 
commodity prices, most miners struggled to keep 
operating, let alone invest in processing facilities. 
6 GRT Lawyers. (2014). Indonesia’s mineral ore export ban takes effect. Retrieved from https://www.grtlawyers.com/indonesias-mineral-ore-export-
ban-takes-effect/
7 PwC Indonesia. (2014). Export ban on unprocessed minerals effective 12 January 2014—three-year reprieve for some, but uncertainty remains 
(Energy, Utilities and Mining, NewsFlash no. 50). Retrieved from https://www.pwc.com/id/en/publications/assets/eumpublications/newsflash/2014/
eumnewsflash-50.pdf
8 Ibid.
9 Forbes. (2014, April). Freeport McMoRan’s proposed Indonesian smelter may not be ready by 2017. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/
greatspeculations/2014/04/07/freeport-mcmorans-proposed-indonesian-smelter-may-not-be-ready-by-2017/#5843a1e8342a
10 Rusmana, Y., & Listiyorini, E. (2017, February). Indonesia’s export ban flip-flop sows confusion. QuickTake Q&A. BloombergMarkets. Retrieved from 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-14/indonesia-s-export-ban-flip-flop-sows-confusion-quicktake-q-a
11 GRT Lawyers (2014), Id. note 6.
12 We can’t determine the extent to which the Accenture study has neutralized the impact of decline in prices on mining revenues.
13 Pillay, S. (2016, February). The impact of Indonesia’s raw mineral ore export ban on global mining. Accenture.com, Retrieved from https://www.
accenture.com/us-en/blogs/blogs-impact-indonesia-raw-mineral-ore; see also: Kartini, M. (2017, March). Why investor confidence is low in Indonesia’s 
mining industry. Indonesia Expat. Retrieved from http://indonesiaexpat.biz/business-property/investor-confidence-low-indonesias-mining-industry/
14 Bellefleur, D. (2014, February). Indonesia: Mining industry, Indonesia export ban. Tractus Issue ID. 2. Retrieved from http://docplayer.net/53180573-
Indonesia-export-ban.html
In 2014, it was reported that more than 100 mining 
companies had either reduced or shut down their 
operations. Consequently, thousands of mine 
workers were laid off ahead of the ban being 
implemented, triggering protests in Jakarta by 
the National Mine Workers Union. The Indonesian 
Mineral Entrepreneurs Association threatened 
to challenge the ban in the Supreme Court.11 
Accenture (2015) estimated that the ban led to a 
20 per cent decline in Indonesia’s mining revenues, 
with the bauxite and nickel sectors most impacted, 
and that the mining sector’s contribution to GDP 
dropped from 11 per cent in 2010/2012 to about 7.2 
per cent in 2015. The ban also negatively impacted 
other industries with strong 
forward linkages with the mining 
sector.12, 13
While the Government of 
Indonesia anticipated these 
short-term losses (the Minister 
of Finance, for example, stated 
that this policy would reduce 
government revenues by USD 
820 million in 2014 through 
lost royalties and taxes), it was 
convinced that the policy would 
result in a net positive impact in the medium to 
long term. This belief was based on the fact that 
already in 2013, 25 companies had invested USD 
6 billion in processing facilities.14 In 2016, Chinese 
investments into nickel smelting capacities 
amounted to USD 15 billion, with Chinese nickel 
pig iron producers appreciating the higher metal 
content of the Indonesian nickel compared to 
Despite this investment wave, 
insufficient smelting capacity was 
built by the time the export ban was 
to take its full effect.
4neighbouring countries.15 Also, Freeport McMoRan 
initiated partnerships with Indonesian companies 
to build smelters.16
Despite this investment wave, insufficient smelting 
capacity was built by the time the export ban was 
to take its full effect. Companies complained about 
the lack of access to reliable 
power to build smelters. As a 
result of mounting pressure, 
increasing unemployment and 
a fall in government revenues, 
the President of Indonesia 
announced the scaling back of 
the ban in March 2017 (just two 
months after it came into effect).
THE REFORM OF 
THE BAN
The permit to export semi-processed metals 
(Type 2 minerals) has been extended for five years, 
subject to the following conditions: 
• Progress needs to be shown toward building 
processing facilities. 
• Only ore with nickel content less than  
1.7 per cent and certain grades of bauxite 
can be exported without further processing.
• Miners should supply domestic smelters with 
enough low-grade ore to meet 30 per cent 
of their capacity.
• Companies such as Freeport McMoRan 
(which owns and operates the giant 
Grasberg gold/copper mine) are required 
to convert their “contract of work” into a 
“special mining business license.”17 To secure 
15 Jensen, F., & Burton, M. (2014, January). As smelters weigh cost, Indonesia’s ore export ban may backfire. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.
com/article/indonesia-minerals-smelters/as-smelters-weigh-cost-indonesias-ore-export-ban-may-backfire-idUSL3N0KY20P20140127
16 Forbes (2014), Id. note 9.
17 These terms are specific to Indonesia’s legal regime for mining. For more information see PwC. (2017). Mining in Indonesia: Investment and taxation 
guide. Retrieved from https://www.pwc.com/id/en/energy-utilities-mining/assets/mining/mining-guide-2017-web.pdf
18 Asmarini, W.,  & Munthe, B.C. (2017, January). Indonesia eases export ban on nickel ore, bauxite. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-indonesia-mining-exports/indonesia-eases-export-ban-on-nickel-ore-bauxite-idUSKBN14W1TZ. See also Jamasmie, C. (2017, August). 
Freeport to yield control of giant Grasberg copper mine to Indonesia. Mining.com. Retrieved from http://www.mining.com/freeport-to-yield-control-of-
giant-grasberg-copper-mine-to-indonesia/?utm_source=digest-en-mining-170829&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=digest
19 Asmarini, W. & Jensen, F. (2017, January). Nickel smelters consider suing Indonesia after ore export ban U-turn. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-mining/nickel-smelters-consider-suing-indonesia-after-ore-export-ban-u-turn-idUSKBN14X12A
20 Grey, E. (2017, March). Arrested development: Why Indonesia lifted its mining export ban. Mining Technology. Retrieved from http://www.mining-
technology.com/features/featurearrested-development-why-indonesia-lifted-its-mining-export-ban-5760809/
21 Asmarini, & Jensen (2017), Id. note 19.
its export permit, Freeport McMoRan was 
required to yield a 51 per cent share in 
the Gasberg project to the government 
(compared to the current mandatory 30 per 
cent) as well as to pay taxes from which it 
had been exempt—a request that Freeport 
McMoRan recently agreed to.18
While most mining companies welcomed the delay 
of the ban, Indonesia’s smelting industry and those 
companies that had heavily invested in processing 
facilities during tough financial years protested. 
These investments were performed under the 
expectation that they would receive a guaranteed 
supply of ore. Now non-compliance was rewarded, 
and domestic smelters would likely only receive 
the lowest-grade ore, thereby reducing their 
margins. These investors are jointly reviewing legal 
steps against the Indonesian government for this 
change in regulation.19
Mining operators elsewhere fear a depression 
of prices by the release of more metals on 
the market. Following the announcement that 
Indonesia delayed the export ban, nickel and 
copper prices fell20 significantly, affecting the 
shares of major producers. Vale’s shares, for 
example fell by 15.9 per cent in one day.21
The relaxation of the export ban 
is aimed at allowing miners to 
reconstitute their financial capacity to 
be able to invest in smelting facilities
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The relaxation of the export ban is aimed at 
allowing miners to reconstitute their financial 
capacity to be able to invest in smelting facilities22 
and to raise tax revenues from the mining sector. 
It is hoped that this delay will also reestablish 
the balance sheet of the state-owned nickel 
company Antam, whose profits plummeted after 
the ban was introduced (Antam lost its ability to 
export without the possibility to sell to smelters to 
compensate for the export losses).23
It remains to be seen if companies will build the 
required smelting capacity by the new deadline 
this time around. The lack of infrastructure 
access is still a significant constraint to the 
construction of processing facilities that has yet 
to be addressed. There has also been criticism 
that the processing policy is leading to increased 
corruption. It is alleged by some that political 
connections and payoffs are a key determining 
factor of receiving an export permit. 24
22 Rusmana, & Listiyorini (2017, February), Id. note 10.
23 Burton, E. (2017, Oct.–Dec.). The life and death of Indonesia’s mineral export ban. Inside Indonesia. Retrieved from http://www.insideindonesia.org/the-
life-and-death-of-indonesia-s-mineral-export-ban
24 Interviews with Indonesian experts, November 2017.
KEY LESSONS
• A blanket ban is a blunt instrument 
that does not take into account project 
economics. Changing market dynamics like 
the recent fall in commodity prices can derail 
downstream beneficiation policies and harm 
investor confidence.
• The geological quality is what determines 
the ability to force the sector to move 
downstream (bauxite investments have 
left Indonesia while the nickel and copper 
investments have remained).
• Short-term losses may turn into long-term 
benefits. However, the latter are hard to 
foresee and quantify.
• Downstream policy measures that are not 
clear, consistent and transparent may lead 
to corruption opportunities. 
